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"Effects of Immigration on Investment."

This paper documents how corporate investment reacts to immigration. I use an interaction of the ex-ante cluster of migrants and a change in immigration policy in the UK to provide evidence that investment increases in anticipation of immigration flows. The time variation in immigration policy allows me to control for local economic shocks, reducing endogeneity concerns. Part of the increase in investment occurs through a transitory increase in fixed assets. The major change occurs in the extensive margin, through an increase in firm creation. The increase is larger for the knowledge and the service sector, suggesting that human capital is an important driver of the effect. The results suggest that firms react fast to an immigration-induced labor supply shock.

"Identifying export side effects of law enforcement during the Mexican Drug War." with Jose Morales and Bernardo Ricca.

[Accepted at the Journal of International Economics]

This paper finds that law enforcement interventions during the Mexican Drug War (MDW) hindered local export growth. We leverage exogenous variation in drug enforcement from the close election of mayors affiliated with the national ruling party during the MDW. Firms servicing the same markets but exogenously exposed to drug enforcement experienced lower export growth. Most importantly, the MDW eroded capital investments, obstructing large exporters of capital-intensive manufactures.

Work in Progress

"A Managerial Explanation for Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Evidence from European Football."

[Version available upon request]

Are inexperienced managers more likely to invest additional cash sub-optimally? To answer this question, this paper uses a new hand-constructed database on odds of football matches, football managers, and player trades of teams that participate in the European Champions League from 2000 until 2014. I provide evidence that wins in matches with close odds ex-ante are as good as randomly assigned, and, in particular, uncorrelated with the experience or age of managers. I then show that teams with inexperienced managers significantly spend the cash obtained in close matches to acquire new players; while experienced managers do not engage in this behavior. Teams do not perform better after the new acquisitions, suggesting inexperienced managers may not spend cash to benefit the team.

"Shareholder activism and target CEO gender" with Jana Fidrmuc and Jiaqi Zhao.

"The impact of household debt on labor supply" with Nelson Camanho, Bernardo Ricca, and Toni Santos.

Working Papers
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